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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Uniited Kingdom
Excessive bail may not be required. Only the
amount of bail which is reasonably calculated to
insure that the accused will stand trial is permis-
sible in a bailable offense.
Cruel and Unusual Punishments
The Federal Constitution provides that cruel
and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.
The punishments which are authorized must be
set forth in the applicable statute and may in-
clude death, imprisonment, fine.
The Bill of Rights, 1688, provides that "exces-
sive bail ought not to be required." Except in
various serious offenses, such as murder, bail is
discretionary with the court. A person charged
with other than certain enumerated indictable
misdemeanors, before a justice of the peace is
entitled to bail.
Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Although there is no express statutory pro-
hibition against the imposition of cruel and un-
usual punishments in English law, a court may
impose only such sentences as are enumerated
and authorized by statute.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES*
Prosecutor May Ask for Mistrial without Fear
of Double Jeopardy-The defendant went on
trial for selling narcotics. When his counsel at-
tempted to impeach the prosecuting witness on
cross-examination the judge charged counsel with
making a "manufactured and emotional appeal"
to the jury. Following a colloquy between counsel
and the court, the prosecutor asked for a mistrial
and it was granted. Defendant was later retried
and convicted. He appealed on the ground that
his second trial had placed him in double jeop-
ardy. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the ap-
peal. People v. Thomas, 155 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. 1959).
The court admitted that the defendant had
been placed in jeopardy at the first trial. It did
not follow, though, the court declared, that the
defendant's constitutional rights had been vio-
lated; juries have been discharged, and the de-
fendant tried again, in many instances, e.g., when
a judge or juror has been taken ill, without double
jeopardy following.
The court seemed bothered by the fact that
here the prosecutor asked for the mistrial. (See
Abstract, "Mistrial As Acquittal," in vol. 49, at
p. 356 of this Journal.)
The court avoided this, however, by holding
that the remark of the trial judge to defendant's
counsel was such serious error that a new trial or
reversal would have been granted if the trial had
gone to conclusion and the defendant had been
convicted. Since the result was the same in either
* Prepared by Francis A. Heroux, Senior Law Stu-
dent, Northwestern University School of Law.
event, the court declared that the double jeopardy
clause should not be given such an "expanded
scope" that would allow the defendant to escape
entirely.
To discourage prosecutors from deliberately
setting up a mistrial situation, the court warned
that "Different considerations might well come
into play if the defect had been caused by the
prosecution in an effort to secure an unfair ad-
vantage."
Jury Sees Jar Containing Victim's Flesh-In a
prosecution for murder, committed by attaching
dynamite to the ignition system of the victim's
automobile, the prosecution brought into the
courtroom and placed on the counsel table a jar
which contained a portion of the flesh of the de-
ceased. Defense counsel strenuously objected to
this, and the trial judge excluded both the jar
and its contents from the evidence. After the de-
fendant was convicted and given a ninety-nine
year sentence, he appealed on the ground that
the use of the jar was prejudicial error. The Court
of Criminal Appeals of Texas denied the appeal
and affirmed the conviction, holding that, even
though the jar was excluded from evidence, it had
a sufficient connection with the case, so that it
was reasonable for the prosecutor to attempt to
introduce the jar into the evidence. Washburn v.
State, 318 S.W.2d 627 (Texas 1958).
The defendant's argument was that this jar
was obviously improper evidence, and thus it was
prejudicial error for the prosecutor to bring it
into the courtroom, in view of the jury, under the
United Slates
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most heinous crime must be given a fair trial,
and his rights protected as an American citizen.
The court, in carrying out this duty, determined
that photographs such as these were so gruesome
and shocking that they were always prejudicial,
unless they served a very important purpose in
the case. However, the instant photographs served
no material purpose, other than to arouse the
emotions of the jury, and so their use was re-
versible error.
In vigorously opposing the announced decision,
the dissent said, "A murder trial is never a Sunday
School Picnic and can not be turned into one."
Thus, if an accused created the "horrible sight"
constituting the crime, the jury should know just
how terrible it was. Likewise, society owes the
defendant no protection from the consequences of
his own viciousness and depravity in the com-
mission of his crimes. The dissent characterized
the rule announced in the majority opinion as
substantiating the belief that, the more horrible
and shocking the crime, the more likely it is that
the guilty party will be able to escape conviction
through the exclusion of such evidence "because
it would prejudice the jury."
Court Protects Marriage in Mann Act Prosecu-
tion-The petitioner was convicted on a charge
of violating the Mann Act (18 U.S.C. §2421) by
transporting a girl from Arkansas to Oklahoma for
immoral purposes. Over the petitioner's objec-
tions, the District Court permitted the Govern-
ment to use his wife as a witness against him.
The petitioner appealed, and the United States
Supreme Court reversed his conviction, holding
that the federal courts must bar the testimony
of one spouse against the other unless both con-
sent. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
Mr. Justice Black, delivering the opinion for
the court, stated that the basic reason the law
refused to pit wife against husband or husband
against wife in a trial, where life or liberty is at
stake, is the belief that such a policy is necessary
to foster family peace, not only for the benefit
of husband, wife, and children, but for the benefit
of the public as well. The Government did not
dispute this point, but rather argued that if a
husband or wife testifies against the other volun-
tarily, it is a strong indication that the marriage
is already gone, and thus the general rule should
have no application. The Court conceded that this
might be true in some cases, but it would not
believe that all marital flare-ups, in which one
spouse wants to hurt the other, are permanent.
Therefore, it could not allow adverse testimony
which would surely destroy almost any marriage.
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the result
reached by the majority, but he expressed a
greatly divergent attitude toward the husband-
wife privilege. He expressed concern that the an-
nounced rule would impede the discovery of truth
in a court of law, and thus impede the doing of
justice. However, he did not dissent, because he
believed that the facts of this case indicated that
the petitioner's wife testified involuntarily, since
she had been imprisoned as a material witness,
and released under a bond conditioned upon her
appearance in court as a witness for the Govern-
ment.
Wife Testimony Against Husband in Federal
Cases-The Hawkins Case Distinguished-The
petitioner was convicted on a charge that he
violated the Mann Act (18 U.S.C. §2421) by
transporting a girl from one state to another for
immoral purposes. In this case, the woman trans-
ported was the petitioner's wife. At the trial, his
wife, the prosecutrix, was allowed to testify about
the crime, over the petitioner's objections. The
conviction was appealed on the basis of Hawkins
v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958) (see above
abstract), but the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction,
holding that a wife may testify against her hus-
band concerning pre-marital Mann Act violations
against her. Wyatt v. United States, 27 U.S.L.
WEEK 2358 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1959).
The court acknowledged that the Hawkins case
reaffirmed the general common law rule that a
husband or wife may not testify against the
other, but the court pointed out that dictim in
the Hawkins case recognized that the general
rule did not apply where the husband commits
an offense against the person of his wife. The de-
fendant contended that this exception did not
displace the general rule in this case, because,
although the woman and the defendant may have
been contemplating marriage, she was not, at
the time of the alleged offense, his wife. Thus,
any possible offense was not, and could not have
been, against the person of his wife. But this
distinction the court refused to accept, holding that
the fact that the transportation occurred before
marriage certainly would not disqualify the
testimony of the wife who was the victim.
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